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Abstract 
Research on the Commonsense Self-Regulation Model (CS-SRM) has emphasized 
reflective/conscious perceptual processes regarding illness threat (beliefs about symptoms, 
consequences, timeline and curability) in predicting and changing coping behaviours. 
Understanding of illness self-regulation and avenues for intervention might be enriched by 
consideration of automatic processes that influence the recognition and identification of 
illness, response to illness, and ongoing management. This article adopts an integrative 
approach to (1) outline the theoretical importance of implicit processes in patients’ self-
regulation of illness and methods to study them; (2) review research evidence for these 
processes, including interventions tested to modify them; and (3) outline avenues for future 
research. A substantial body of research on implicit processes (cognitive bias and 
interpretational bias) in illness maintenance in chronic illness has recently been extended to   
detection and interpretation of acute illness and new perspectives relating to the self-system. 
There is encouraging evidence that cognitive accessibility of coping and implicit attitudes 
may impact upon coping behaviours. Procedures that strategically automatize coping 
responses and create habits have considerable promise. We outline an agenda for future 
research in which health psychology accepts the challenge posed by the interplay of the 
reflective and associative systems in promoting effective self-regulation of illness. 
Keywords: Commonsense Model of Self-Regulation, illness cognition, automatic 
processes, action planning, habit 
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Automatic Processes and Self-Regulation of Illness 
 The Commonsense Self-Regulation Model (CS-SRM; Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 
1980; Leventhal, Phillips, & Burns, 2016) is a widely used health behaviour theory that 
describes the processes involved in identifying that one is ill and in initiating and maintaining 
a self-regulation process to restore a state of health or mitigate threat. The CS-SRM addresses 
both automatic (i.e., non-conscious, non-deliberative, fast/efficient, implicit, impulsive) and 
reflective (i.e., conscious, deliberative, effortful, cognitively taxing, explicit) factors involved 
in detection and interpretation of illness threats, formation of illness and treatment 
representations and action plans, and initiation and maintenance of treatment behaviour(s). 
Further, the CS-SRM treats these automatic and reflective factors as dynamic and interactive, 
influencing each other and changing over time and with experience (e.g., illness progression, 
treatment changes, patient preferences/changes). However, a majority of research efforts 
regarding CS-SRM processes have focused on measurement of the reflective, cognitive 
constructs, such as patients’ beliefs regarding the illness identity, cause, control, 
timeline/duration, and consequences, and their beliefs about prescribed medication to predict 
self-management, treatment adherence and health outcomes (see Hagger, Koch, 
Chatzisarantis, & Orbell, 2017, and Horne et al., 2013, for recent meta-analyses of these 
relationships). While there are many important avenues for research regarding reflective CS-
SRM processes (see Hagger et al., 2017 and other articles in this issue), we also see potential 
advancement in theory and healthcare that might be derived from the study of automatic 
processes in patients’ self-regulation of illness. 
Whereas consideration of reflective processes in self-regulation provides important 
information about the ways in which people deliberately guide their actions, psychology also 
recognizes the important role played by more impulsive, automatic systems in guiding 
behaviour outside of conscious awareness (see Bargh, 1994; Evans, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 
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2004). Conceptual and empirical reviews have sought to identify possible avenues for an 
implicit-processes research agenda in health and illness behaviour: the very first issue of this 
journal included an important review of implicit processes that can impact upon health and 
illness behaviour (Aarts, 2007), such as automatic processes involved in goal activation and 
pursuit; Sheeran, Gollwitzer, and Bargh (2013) provide an overview of implicit cognition, 
affect, and motivation and their potential involvement in and effect on health; and a recent 
special issue of Health Psychology Review presents the opportunities for implicit methods in 
predicting and intervening in health behaviours (Hagger, 2016; Hollands, Marteau, & 
Fletcher, 2016; Papies, 2016; Rebar et al., 2016). These conceptual articles cite a general 
paucity of empirical evidence regarding automatic processes in health-related behaviour and 
an agenda that, to date, focuses primarily on prevention of illness.  
We propose that understanding of and intervention in illness self-regulation might be 
enhanced by attention to automatic processes that influence the recognition of illness, 
identification of illness (labeling), response to illness, and ongoing management. That is, 
because behaviour is driven at least partially by forces outside of our awareness and 
conscious intention, evaluating these mechanisms, suggested by the CS-SRM, should 
improve the ability of research to explain variance in behaviour, to outline conditions under 
which and for whom behaviour occurs, and to design effective interventions for improving 
illness management. As recently argued by Hagger et al. (2017), Leventhal et al. (2016) and  
Phillips, Leventhal, and Burns (2017), researchers need to study dynamic self-regulation 
processes using new experimental paradigms, including those utilized in the study of implicit 
processes. 
The purpose of this conceptual review is to outline automatic processes that occur in 
individuals’ self-regulation of illness threats and to demonstrate the potential for these 
processes and associated methodologies for improving researchers’ prediction of and 
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intervention into health and illness-related behaviour and outcomes. We organize the review 
into two sections, which broadly correspond to the first and second halves of the illness self-
regulation process: first, we address topics related to illness schema activation, involved in 
illness threat detection/recognition and interpretation; and second, we address topics related 
to the automatic processes involved in coping and illness management. In each section, we 
cover three main points: first, we describe the relevant, automatic processes involved in that 
aspect of illness self-regulation. Second, we review empirical evidence regarding these 
automatic processes, along with the methods used to study them and interventions that have 
been tested to manipulate these processes. Third, we discuss implications for future research 
and interventions for addressing known problems in self-regulation of illness (e.g., medically 
undiagnosed syndromes; delay in symptom identification and care-seeking, non-adherence to 
medication and rehabilitation). A glossary of key concepts considered in the review, 
presented in the order in which they arise in the text is provided in Table 1, and Figure 1 
illustrates the proposed roles of implicit processes in illness self-regulation.  
Automatic Processes in Individuals’ Illness-Threat Detection and Interpretation 
 The CS-SRM proposes that the central route to illness identification involves the 
detection of somatic, physical or functional deviation that exceeds normally expected 
variability from an underlying prototype of the usual physical self, shown in the left hand 
portion of Figure 1.  The identification of such variability signals illness (symptom versus 
benign sensation). Interpretation of this symptomatic experience depends upon matching it to 
schematically represented information about illness in memory (e.g. Henderson, Hagger & 
Orbell, 2007). A great deal of evidence of cognitive processes in illness has employed self-
report questionnaire measures to sample beliefs about illness (Hagger & Orbell, 2003; 
Hagger et al., 2017). These methods sample the explicit products of cognitive processing 
rather than cognitive processing itself. Implicit cognition research employs experimental 
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methods to access cognitive structure (e.g. schematic knowledge about illness) and cognitive 
processes (e.g. attention to particular illness stimuli) that stay outside of a person’s 
awareness. These processes are considered implicit because responses to stimuli occur 
without a participant intending the response, recognising that the stimulus has affected his or 
her responses, and in some cases (e.g. subliminal stimulus presentation paradigms) without 
awareness of the stimulus itself (Bargh, 1994).  
 Implicit illness cognition research to date has focused on two cognitive processes: 
attentional bias, and interpretation bias. Attentional bias refers to the process in which 
particular stimuli capture a person’s attention and is typically measured by modifications of 
the Stroop (1935) colour naming task or the visual dot probe task (MacLeod, Matthews & 
Tata, 1986). These tasks detect selection of stimuli for attention shown either by facilitation 
of responses to those stimuli, or by disruption in responding to other stimuli presented 
concurrently. Attention bias paradigms that employ modifications of the colour Stroop task 
require participants to name the font colour of words that are either illness related or neutral 
control words; the difference in the time taken to name illness versus control words is used to 
infer attentional bias. Response time latency represents interference in speed of colour 
naming due to inability to avoid attending to the word meaning in the illness stimuli. If 
participants are slower to identify the colour of illness related words than neutral words, this 
is taken as evidence that illness related words captured the attention. In the visual probe task, 
two words or pictures are presented simultaneously on a computer screen, before a dot, arrow 
or other probe replaces one word/picture. The participant is required to indicate where on the 
screen the dot is presented. In modifications of this task to assess illness cognition, one word 
is illness related and the other neutral. Attentional bias is calculated as the difference in 
response speed to identify the location of probes that replaced illness words and control 
words. Response latency to illness words indicates attentional bias, because detection should 
AUTOMATIC PROCESSES AND ILLNESS SELF-REGULATION  7 
 
be quicker in the attended area of the screen. The inference is that a participant was attending 
to the illness word when the probe appeared. Variations to these tasks include masking to 
manipulate conscious awareness of stimuli, and variations in duration of stimulus 
presentation (stimulus onset asynchrony) to distinguish attentional capture from maintenance 
of attention. It is also possible to infer attentional avoidance, or a bias to direct attention away 
from illness words, if a participant is faster to identify the location of probes that replace 
neutral words (Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998; Field & Cox, 2008; Yiend, 2010).  
Considerable research addresses attentional biases in participant populations with 
chronic conditions, including chronic pain (e.g., Crombez, Van Ryckeghem, Eccleston &Van 
Damme, 2013; Pincus & Morley, 2001), chronic fatigue syndrome (e.g., Hou et al., 2014; 
Hughes, Hirsch, Chalder & Moss-Morris, 2016), irritable bowel syndrome (e.g. Phillips, 
Wright, & Kent, 2014), psoriasis (e.g., Fortune et al., 2003), and asthma (e.g., Jessop, Rutter, 
Sharma & Albery, 2004). Typically this research has compared patient populations with 
healthy controls to establish (correlational) association between attentional bias and illness 
behaviour (symptom experience). The rationale for this endeavour is that cognitive 
processing biases may serve to causally maintain chronic disabling conditions and impede 
recovery, similar to findings that cognitive biases causally maintain anxiety disorders 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002). Attention to stimuli likely to 
signal physical harm—pain or fatigue for example—acts as a gatekeeper, prioritizing the 
detection of harm related stimuli. In relation to pain conditions, Pincus and Morley (2001) 
concluded that the hypothesis of attention bias towards pain stimuli was unsupported, 
although counter-intuitive with explicit accounts of pain and clinical observation. A more 
recent meta-analytic review (Crombez et al., 2013) generally supported this conclusion; 
reliable evidence of attentional bias was restricted to laboratory studies where participants 
expected pain in an upcoming task. A review of studies of chronic fatigue syndrome reported 
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inconclusive evidence (Hughes et al., 2016). However, a recent study addressing previous 
methodological concerns (Hughes, Chalder, Hirsch & Moss- Morris, 2017) establishes 
reliable evidence for attentional maintenance toward words associated with the condition 
(e.g., fatigue, drained, housebound). Fortune and colleagues (Fortune et al., 2003) obtained 
evidence of attentional bias in people with psoriasis, relative to controls, whereas van Beugen 
et al. (2016) found attentional bias to disease stimuli in participants with alopecia. 
  Interpretation bias refers to bias in the manner in which people resolve ambiguity and 
uncertainty in selecting meaning and action (Mathews &Mackintosh, 2000). Contextual 
information can provide guides to interpretation of stimuli (e.g., feeling sick after a seafood 
lunch or breathlessness after climbing the stairs having recently seen a television program 
about heart disease), whereas in the absence of contextual information, individuals rely upon 
internally generated information from a predominantly accessible schema (e.g., my legs are 
stiff because there is something seriously wrong with my legs). These processes can and do 
often occur in conscious awareness, but evidence suggests that they may also arise 
automatically. A range of tasks including the homophone task, homonym task, the word stem 
completion task, and the ambiguous scenarios task measure interpretation bias (for review see 
Hirsch, Meeten, Krahe & Reeder, 2016). Homophones are words that are pronounced in the 
same way but have different meanings and/or spellings (e.g. pane-pain), whereas homonyms 
are words that sound the same and have the same spelling but different meanings (e.g. 
terminal), and word stems refer to parts of words (e.g. ten_) that might be completed in a 
number of ways (e.g. tender vs. tennis). The ambiguous scenarios task (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000) presents participants with real life self-relevant scenarios, each starting 
with a title and ending ambiguously. This is an encoding task in which participants are 
expected to automatically encode an ending before they complete a subsequent recognition 
test in which they rate the similarity of four sentences in meaning to the original text (one 
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positive interpretation, one negative interpretation, and positive and negative foils to control 
for valence) (see Hughes, Gordon, Chalder, Hirsch & Moss-Morris, 2016, for review of 
methodological considerations). Each of these interpretation bias tasks seeks to identify a 
tendency to resolve ambiguity with negative, illness related or threatening interpretations. To 
date research investigating interpretational biases has also focused on chronic conditions, 
including chronic pain and chronic fatigue syndrome. There is reliable evidence of 
interpretational bias in pain conditions (e.g. Heathcote, Jacobs, Eccleston, Fox & Lau, 2017; 
Pincus and Morley, 2001; Schoth & Liossi, 2016) and in chronic fatigue syndrome (Hughes 
et al., 2017).  
The investigation of implicit bias in illness is a relatively young field, and a number 
of methodological considerations might have impacted upon findings to date. Although it 
might be anticipated that chronic conditions are frequently accompanied by comorbid anxiety 
or depression and that this might impact upon findings, (e.g., Polsky et al., 2005), where 
cognitive biases have been observed in research to date, researchers have typically shown 
that extent of bias is unrelated to indices of affective disorder.  While it is clear that stimuli 
must be specific to the concerns of the particular patient population under consideration, it is 
not clear what the content of those stimuli ought to be. For example, whilst investigation of 
fear of spiders might appropriately explore attentional biases towards spider stimuli, in the 
illness context stimuli might encompass situational cues that provoke symptom expectations 
(such as a verbal or pictorial depiction of a back-stressing movement) or symptoms 
representative of illness itself (such as fatigue or pain). If the goal is to determine bias in the 
interpretation of somatic experience as illness, consideration might also be given to 
presentation of stimuli in the somatosensory modality (e.g. van Laarhoven et al., 2017). 
Additional considerations concern the need for sample sizes that are adequate to detect 
differences in populations where response variability is necessarily likely to be great. We 
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would contend that consideration should also be given to the current goals of the samples. 
For example, patients in treatment or ‘trying’, even unconsciously (Aarts, 2007), to avoid 
attending to stimuli are likely to respond differently to those patients not in treatment (see 
also Field et al., 2016; Papies, Stroebe & Aarts, 2008).  
Whilst evidence is suggestive of links between automatic cognitive processing and 
illness behaviour, the key premise of this research endeavor is that cognitive biases in 
attention and interpretation might be modifiable with consequential amelioration of 
experienced symptoms and therefore illness self-regulation. Research designs that establish if 
changes in cognitive bias are associated with, for example, reductions in fatigue or 
experienced pain or hyper-sensitivity to cancer recurrence might establish a causal role for 
cognitive bias and offer potential for psychological treatments. Cognitive Bias Modification, 
in which participants are trained to disengage from stimuli using a modification of the visual 
probe task (MacCleod et al., 2002) has evolved into various subtypes targeting attention bias, 
interpretation bias, and approach-avoidance training (e.g. Menne-Lothman et al., 2014), and 
some research is beginning to explore their utility in physical conditions such as pain (Sharpe 
et al., 2012; Heathcote et al., 2018). Distraction techniques have also been employed to 
address attentional bias in pain (e.g. van Ryckegen, van Damme, Eccelston & Crombez, 
2018). To date there is limited evidence that these methods are effective in clinical samples 
and several studies report no significant or clinically relevant effect.  
 Research focus to date on participant samples with chronic disabling conditions 
obscures important ways in which implicit processes might be explored in the important 
everyday processes of detecting and identifying illness in the self. Williams, Wasserman, and 
Lotto (2003) and Henderson et al. (2007) investigated implicit illness schema using priming 
techniques. Priming refers to the activation of relevant mental representations by external 
stimuli (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Williams et al. (2003) showed that priming participants 
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by asking them to write about their last illness episode led participants with low self-rated 
health to respond more slowly to illness related words relative to controls in a subsequent 
Stroop task. Henderson et al. (2007) proposed that if information about illness is 
schematically organized, and a prime activates related memory content, then priming a 
specific illness should activate information associated with the primed illness, but not 
concepts associated with a different illness. Results of two experiments lend support to this 
suggestion. Participants primed with ‘common cold’ showed greater attention bias than 
controls to concepts associated with the common cold in a subsequent Stroop task, but not to 
words associated with cardiovascular disease. A second experiment demonstrated a reversal 
of this effect in that a cardiovascular disease prime led participants to respond more slowly to 
words associated with cardiovascular disease but not to words associated with the common 
cold. Findings not only point to schematic organization of well-known illness related 
information, but also suggest ways in which environmental primes might activate or prioritize 
particular schema. Viewed from this perspective, observations that healthy subjects who 
expect (are primed) to anticipate pain show greater attention to pain stimuli (Crombez et al., 
2013) are consistent with activation of a pain schema.  
Biases in attending to and interpreting somatic sensations as indicative of pathology 
might be associated with chronic activation of illness schema characterised by high threat, 
chronicity and uncontrollability. In essence, the prototype of the normal self in a chronically 
ill patient may become enmeshed in the illness prototype so that every sensory experience is 
attended to and interpreted as a symptom indicative of existing illness. Orbell and Henderson 
(2016) suggest that illness schema activation by priming might be viewed within an active 
self- account (Smeesters, Wheeler & Kay, 2010; Wheeler, DeMarree & Petty, 2007). People 
possess a vast chronic self-concept of which only a subset can be active at any given moment, 
and serves to guide behaviour (Markus & Wurf, 1987). If a prime (or somatic stimulus) 
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activates knowledge of the functionally deviant self (Leventhal et al., 2011) priming an 
illness schema might lead people to manifest behaviour consistent with the content of that 
primed illness. Orbell and Henderson provide evidence suggestive of this possibility, in that 
non-clinical, healthy participants exposed to subliminal cold/flu primes walked more slowly 
and performed more poorly on subsequent cognitive tasks.  
A few studies have directly investigated the implicit self-concept in chronic illness. 
For example, Riebel, Egloff, and Witthoft (2013) present evidence of an implicit illness self-
concept amongst people with somatoform disorders compared to controls using an Implicit 
Association Task (IAT: Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) that measured the strength of 
association between target words ‘self’ and ‘other’ and the attributes ‘healthiness’ vs 
‘discomfort’. IAT scores were also associated with somatic symptom reporting after 
covarying depression, anxiety, and negative affect, suggestive of an automatic attentional 
process that may foster negative interpretations of somatosensory stimuli. In a subsequent 
study, Riebel and colleagues (Riebel, Egloff, & Witthoft, 2014) report a pre-post trial of an 
intervention that used an evaluative conditioning task in patients with somatoform disorders. 
Following a baseline IAT in which participants sorted nouns reflecting either ‘healthiness’ or 
‘discomfort’ into the categories ‘self’ or ‘other’, participants then completed an evaluative 
conditioning task (Baccus, Baldwin & Packer, 2004) in which they were trained to associate 
self-referential pronouns with health concepts. Results indicated that change in the implicit 
self-concept engendered by the conditioning task was associated with statistically and 
clinically significant reduction in symptoms and illness behaviour at 13-day follow up.   
Future Directions 
 Chronic illness conditions such as those that have been the focus of research efforts 
to date, particularly those characterised under the umbrella term ‘medically undiagnosed 
syndromes (MUS)’ represent a major challenge for health psychology. It has been estimated 
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that up to three quarters of symptoms reported in primary care are not attributable to 
identified organic disease and about 25% of general practice patients have clinically relevant 
MUS, representing considerable economic burden and lost work (Fink, Toft, Hansen, Ornbol, 
& Olesen, 2007; Bermingham, Cohen, Hague, Parsonage, 2010). Patients with these 
conditions often embark upon a lengthy pursuit of organic causation via different medical 
specialisms. One recent model (Van den Bergh, Witthöft, Peterson & Brown, 2017) calls for 
a reconceptualization of medically undiagnosed syndromes as one extreme end of a spectrum 
in which the well-established lack of correspondence between organic pathology and 
symptom experience is recognised for all physical health conditions including those that are 
medically diagnosed. For example, subjective symptom reports correlate poorly with blood 
glucose levels in patients with diabetes (Frankum & Ogden, 2005); in heart disease, self-
reported symptoms correlate poorly with objective parameters of disease (e.g. Sears et al., 
2005). This conceptualization suggests that the brain automatically interprets sensory 
experience as benign versus symptomatic of illness according to predictions based on past 
experience. These predictions may sometimes result in inappropriate categorization of 
sensory experience. For example, the consciously and very really experienced ‘symptom’ of 
movement can be felt in an illusory manner when seated on a stationary train and observing a 
neighbouring train depart. Context cues and past experience will play a fundamental role in 
whether the brain interprets somatic experience as a symptom and whether that consciously 
felt symptom is interpreted as benign (a normal variation of the usual self) or threatening 
(represented in the CS-SRM as an activated illness schema). In the case of chronic illness, 
particularly that of long duration, errors in symptom detection by the interpretation of sensory 
experience might arise when sensory experience more normally ‘fits’ the illness prototype 
(me as ill) than an idealised and historic normal healthy self-prototype. For example, an 
individual who developed chronic fatigue syndrome at age 40 and has been ill for ten years 
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might fail to distinguish the normal somatic sensations that are typical of a person aged 50 
years, from illness.  
We would contend that viewing symptom experience and activation of one prototype 
versus another as a function of contextual cues, prior experience, and prototypes of the 
‘normal functional self’ might provide valuable new insight into symptom detection and 
interpretation more generally. The CS-SRM anticipates the importance of past experience 
and context in these processes, but they have not been extensively studied to date. The 
implications are non-trivial and may impact in important ways upon the chances of injury, 
delay in seeking treatment, and inappropriate self-regulation attempts, as well as upon the 
behaviour of health professionals. Illness schema activation follows from deviations of the 
prototype of the typical normally functioning self, and these normal-self prototypes likely 
change with ageing as depicted in Figure 1. For example, Bernardes, Marques, and Matos 
(2015) showed that older adults (mean age 74 years) primed with a negative ageing 
stereotype were slower to report pain (had higher pain thresholds) in a cold presser task than 
participants exposed to either a positive ageing prime or a neutral prime. Importantly, the 
positive ageing prime served to attenuate the impact of an explicitly expressed negative 
ageing stereotype on pain detection. Findings point to a non-consciously mediated 
mechanism whereby accessibility of the active self-concept impacts upon symptom detection. 
One wonders how ageing self-conception might relate to identification of hearing loss or 
detection of early signs of dementia. Relatedly, idealised normative healthy self-protoypes 
may increase symptom detection and interpretation as illness during recovery postpartum, or 
after surgery  (e.g. Howell et al. 2012, cf. Leventhal, Phillips & Burns, 2016b; Orbell et al., 
1998).  
Environmental context is also likely to impact upon illness identification in important 
ways. Orbell, Henderson, and Hagger (2015) showed that priming the common cold rendered 
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concepts related to the cold more accessible when the common cold was ‘in season’. If 
exposure to illness primes in the environment increases accessibility of a particular illness 
identity, people are more likely to rapidly detect, label, and act to manage symptoms they 
experience. In the context of a rising flu or meningitis pandemic, media communications 
might render schema for those conditions more accessible so that a headache (symptom) 
more readily activates a schema for, say, meningitis, rather than a benign condition. This 
might facilitate public health management of spread of the illness or treatment, if available 
(e.g. Bish & Michie, 2010; Leung, Ho, Chan, Wong & Hedley, 2003). Increased accessibility 
of a particular schema may also increase self- or professional misdiagnosis of symptoms with 
similar characteristics to the accessible illness (Leventhal, Leventhal & Breland, 2011) or 
lead the ‘worried well’ to match minor somatic deviations to the accessible schema 
(Cameron, Leventhal & Leventhal, 1995; Howren & Suls, 2011) and conclude that they are 
ill. Cognitive biases, such as those studied in the fields of decision making and cognitive 
illusion (e.g. Pohl, 2012) that are also proposed to operate without conscious intent and 
without the decision maker realising what has happened, have been studied extensively in 
health professionals. For example, a recent review (Saposnik, Redelmeier, Ruff & Tobler, 
2016) concluded that the overconfidence effect, anchoring effect, information and availability 
biases may be associated with diagnostic inaccuracy or suboptimal patient management.  
Little is known about the acquisition of illness knowledge and development of illness 
schema. Public health measures sometimes aim to form associations between relevant stimuli 
and illness labels (such as a recent UK campaign linking ‘coughing for more than 3 weeks’ to 
the label ‘lung cancer’). In clinical settings, failure to identify symptoms as indicative of 
acute disease progression suggests that symptoms have not been incorporated into disease 
schema so that threat activation is delayed. For example, congestive heart failure patients 
often fail to recognize fluid in the legs and lungs as indicative of progressed and acute heart 
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failure and therefore do not act to seek required emergency care. Relatedly, Leventhal, 
Diefenbach & Leventhal (1992) discussed cognitive biases that arise from faulty acute model 
‘if symptoms, then ill’ thinking in patients with typically asymptomatic chronic conditions. 
These contexts may be considered as those in which an illness representation is not activated 
(between symptom episodes) with consequent failure to engage in prophylactic self- 
management.   
Automatic Processes in Individuals’ Illness-Threat Coping Response and Management  
 The self-regulation processes initiated by recognition of threat may encompass a 
broad range of coping responses that will differ according to whether the threat is acute or 
chronic, life threatening or relatively benign, and whether self-regulatory (coping) responses 
are short term or single actions vs. requiring longer term behavioural change. We contend 
that cognitive processes that operate outside of conscious awareness may influence coping 
behaviours in each of these contexts. To date, investigation of coping responses has tended to 
utilize global measures of coping style rather than investigate specific behavioural responses, 
and recent calls have been made for greater research focus upon measurable coping 
behaviours, such as medical consultations, medication use, diet, smoking and alcohol use 
changes, or engagement in treatment (Hagger et al., 2017). The following sections consider 
ways in which research might be extended to consider cognitive accessibility of, implicit 
affect toward, and automatization of coping behaviours for predicting behavioural 
engagement; we also suggest avenues for modification of coping responses. The roles of 
these processes are depicted in the right hand portion of Figure 1.  
Cognitive Accessibility of Coping Responses 
 Illness prototypes are functional in that they serve to prompt conscious and non-
conscious action (including non-medical responses, care-seeking, and existing treatments) to 
ameliorate threat and/or to restore the normal func
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Leventhal, and Contrada (1998) suggested: “The representation of an illness can affect 
behaviour only when it is activated, though activation does not imply that the representation 
will be fully conscious” (p.8). Some of these non-consciously mediated processes are 
behavioural correlates of biological responses to illness threat (e.g. such as resting or sleeping 
in association with immune function activity in response to infection, Orbell & Henderson, 
2016; or immediate cessation of exertion in response to a pulled muscle during physical 
activity). To illustrate, consider that parents and carers recognise a state of ill health in a 
young child (or even a pet animal) by observation of change in a child’s normal activity and 
temperament rather than a verbal declaration of symptoms or illness labels. Such behavioural 
changes consistent with illness are likely preconscious, governed by brain systems that detect 
and interpret somatosensory deviation, and not accompanied by activation of a developed 
cognitive schema in a young child. Instead, parental observations likely activate illness 
schema leading to action taken with respect to the child.  
 Co-activation of illness schema stored in memory with associated coping responses 
has been investigated in two experimental studies. Henderson, Orbell, and Hagger (2009) 
theorized that if an individual had repeatedly used a particular coping strategy in a particular 
illness context, it was likely that the coping strategy would have become encoded in the 
illness schema as a consequence of frequent co-activation. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
findings of two experiments showed that subliminal activation of a cold/flu schema by 
subliminal priming resulted in attention to the coping strategies ‘lozenge’ and ‘lemsip’ in a 
subsequent grammatical decision task amongst frequent users. Ahluwalia, Hughes, 
McCracken, and Chilcot (2017) replicated and extended this finding by showing that a 
‘headache’ prime influenced responses to the word ‘paracetamol’ amongst participants who 
had previously declared positive beliefs about the efficacy of paracetamol in the treatment of 
headache. An important observation in both studies is that heightened responsiveness to 
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coping responses did not occur as a direct consequence of past use, but only when the illness 
schema was also made accessible by priming. Findings show that behavioural tendencies 
associated with illness experiences in the past are encoded as part of the illness schema and 
are activated when that illness schema is subsequently activated—perhaps becoming the 
‘default’ actions that are activated along with other information about illness. These 
processes are depicted by the bidirectional arrows between coping and automatic activation 
of coping responses in Figure 1. The implications of these findings are far ranging and may 
impact upon perpetuation of maladaptive as well as adaptive coping. For example, a patient 
who begins the use of a maladaptive coping strategy in response to a symptom that activates 
an illness schema might come to repeatedly use this strategy in a relatively automatic manner. 
Conversely, evidence that coping strategy activation requires illness schema activation  
provide insight into observations that patients with asymptomatic conditions such as 
hypertension, hayfever or asthma tend to adhere to treatment regimens and take prophylactic 
medications only when symptoms are present, (“I have asthma only when I have symptoms”; 
Halm, Mora, & Leventhal, 2006; Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985). Priming and context 
effects may also be relevant to promotion of positive management of diseases such as 
hayfever or asthma, where prophylactic medication use is recommended. Orbell et al. (2015) 
showed that even if an individual is not experiencing symptoms and ‘seasonality’ is low, 
priming might activate illness schema in the absence of symptoms and impact upon the 
timely use of preventive medications. Interventions that alter the perceived environment 
might therefore promote illness schema activation and preventive medication use.  
To date, research has not addressed mechanisms for creating associations between 
illness schemas and coping actions. However, Lowe and Norman (2017) used data 
simulations to demonstrate that activation of parts of an illness representation (e.g., illness 
identity of heart attack) automatically activates an appropriate, coherent “profile” or schema 
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of beliefs (e.g., consequences as serious, timeline as acute/fast), which in turn automatically 
activates a previously trained/associated coping response (e.g., seeking emergency care). 
They therefore suggest that automatic processes can explain individuals’ inappropriate as 
well as appropriate responses to illness threat signs, depending on their experiences and 
trained cognitive associations. One way in which stimuli may be made more accessible in 
memory and non-consciously activate particular coping actions is by forming implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). We address this possibility in a later section.  
A few studies have shown associations between cognitive bias for illness relevant 
stimuli and behaviour. Hughes et al. (2017) reported positive correlations between somatic 
interpretive bias and ‘all or nothing’ coping behaviour in patients with chronic fatigue 
syndrome. Overdoing things when symptom free and needing to rest for prolonged periods in 
response to symptoms contributes to maintenance of fatigue. Jessop et al. (2004) showed that 
attentional bias in an asthma symptom Stroop task was associated with asthma preventative 
inhaler use in a U-shaped manner—that is, low adherers and high adherers both showed 
greater attentional bias to symptoms than moderate adherers. However, to date, changes in 
cognitive bias have not been shown to causally determine changes in coping behaviour.  
Implicit Affective Evaluations of Coping Behaviours 
Coping responses may be determined by their mental accessibility but also by 
individuals’ implicit attitudes about and/or implicit affective responses to those actions—both 
towards health-promoting actions and existing, health-risky actions. Implicit attitudes are 
thought to be automatic affective evaluations of objects or behaviours that have been learned 
through past experience (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), and there is evidence that they 
may even form indirectly—that is, Payne, Lee, Giletta, and Prinstein (2016) showed that 
implicit positive attitudes towards drinking alcohol can develop during adolescence in 
advance of drinking alcohol. When relevant stimuli are encountered, affective associations 
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are rapidly and automatically activated. Implicit attitudes are important to measure, because 
individuals may possess implicit attitudes that cannot be captured by explicit (self-report 
questionnaire) methods; people may have social desirability concerns that make them 
unwilling to report attitudes, be unaware of their implicit attitudes and therefore unable to 
report them, or their reflective attitudes and opinions may be different to the more impulsive 
in-the-moment attitudes captured by implicit measures (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011).  
Implicit attitudes may play a role in explaining attendance at medical consultations or 
attendance for medical procedures as well as medication use, and recommendations regarding 
behavioural change. This might be expected particularly to be the case where an explicitly 
held belief that a coping response is ‘a good thing’ coexists with an implicit negative 
affective reaction to the coping response and/or an implicit positive affective reaction to 
alternative/conflicting responses, such as might be held towards unpleasant but necessary 
aversive medical procedures or products (e.g., vile tasting yet nutritive tonics for individuals’ 
at risk of malnutrition) or overcoming highly rewarding existing behaviours (e.g., high-fat 
snacks; substance use). Considering implicit attitudes/affect towards treatment-related 
behaviours may be also particularly important for illness domains that are highly sensitive or 
stigmatized and for which treatments may have negative associations, such as HIV, drug and 
alcohol abuse, pregnancy termination, mental illness, and diagnosis of dementia or hearing 
loss. Evidence suggests that implicit and explicit attitudes have discriminant validity and 
predict behaviour independently from each other (Greenwald, Poehlman, Ulman, & Banaji, 
2009; Conner, Perugini, O’Gorman, Ayres, & Prestwich, 2007); therefore taking both into 
consideration may best advance understanding of individuals’ engagement in specific coping 
responses. 
Implicit attitudes towards health-related behaviours have been most commonly 
measured with reaction-time tasks, such as the IAT (Greenwald, McPhee & Schwartz, 1998), 
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and the evaluative priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Herring et al., 
2013). In the evaluative priming task, participants are primed with health or treatment-related 
stimuli (e.g., words related to exercise or a person engaging in exercise) and then asked to 
judge a target word as positive or negative in valence. If the individual has a positive implicit 
attitude towards the stimulus, it is assumed he/she will more quickly judge a positive target 
word as positive and more slowly judge a negative target word as negative after being primed 
with the stimulus (speed is compared to that individual’s speed in judging target words’ 
valence after being primed with neutral stimuli). A method used to measure implicit attitudes 
particularly regarding substance use and that is not based on reaction time/latency is the 
affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Steward, 2005; Payne et 
al., 2016). In this task, participants are primed with an image or word of interest (e.g., health- 
and treatment-related stimuli) and then asked to judge how pleasing a neutral stimulus, such 
as a Chinese pictograph, is. Implicit attitudes are inferred from the degree to which an 
individual finds the neutral stimulus to be more or less pleasing than similar images presented 
without a prime. 
Some research has utilized implicit measures of medication-related attitudes, but the 
few studies to-date show mixed effects of implicit attitudes on adherence. Rüsch, Todd, 
Bodenhausen, Weiden, and Corrigan (2010) found that implicit attitudes towards psychiatric 
medications predicted perceived need for treatment among patients with psychiatric 
conditions but did not predict their adherence. Linn, Wennekers, Vervloet, van Dijk, & van 
den Bemt (2016) examined implicit attitudes towards rheumatoid arthritis medication. 
Explicit and implicit attitudes were unrelated in their study, and explicit attitudes predicted 
(self-reported) adherence whereas implicit attitudes did not. Goubert, Crombez, Hermans and 
Vanderstraeten (2003) employed an evaluative priming paradigm to demonstrate implicit 
negative affective responses to photographic representations of back stressing activity among 
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chronic pain patients compared to non-pain samples. Howell, Ratliff, and Shepperd (2016) 
developed a speeded (automatic) measure of attitude towards receiving health risk 
information regarding melanoma, heart disease or a fictitious illness that offered superior 
prediction of health information avoidance compared to an explicit measure.  
Regarding lifestyle behaviours, there is some evidence that negative implicit attitudes 
towards physical activity are associated with lower levels of physical activity among obese 
individuals (Chevance, Caudroit, Romain, & Boiché, 2017) and in clinical populations 
requiring physical activity as treatment (Chevance, Varray, and Boiche, 2017). Antoniewicz 
and Brand (2016) used a reaction-time-based evaluative priming task to measure automatic 
affective evaluations of exercise and found that these evaluations predicted who dropped out 
early, who dropped out late, and who maintained exercise over the course of a 14-weeks 
programme. Positive implicit attitude towards unhealthy foods and alcohol is associated with 
greater consumption of those foods/alcohol (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Hofmann, 
Rauch, & Gawronksi, 2007) in non-clinical populations. Children who are obese have shown 
an implicit positive attitude towards foods in general, compared to non-obese children but no 
difference in implicit attitude towards physical activity (Craeynest et al., 2005). Roefs and 
Jansen (2002) found that obese individuals had stronger negative implicit attitudes towards 
high fat foods than did non-obese individuals, however. There is very little evidence 
regarding the role of implicit attitudes towards unhealthy behaviours in clinical populations 
who are recommended to engage in lifestyle change for illness self-management. 
There is some evidence that implicit attitudes can be modified using techniques such 
as evaluative conditioning (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens & Crombez, 2010). 
Evaluative conditioning trains participants to form new affective associations towards target 
stimuli by pairing them with positive and negative unconditioned stimuli. Evaluative 
conditioning has been found to improve individuals’ automatic evaluations of exercise and 
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actual engagement in exercise (Antoniewicz & Brand, 2016) as well as altering affective 
responses towards and therefore impulses to consume unhealthy foods (Hollands, Prestwich, 
& Marteau, 2011; see also St. Quinton & Brunton, 2017). Hollands et al. (2011) paired 
images of unhealthy snacks with aversive consequences from eating those snacks (the 
evaluative conditioning) in order to alter individuals’ implicit attitudes towards the snacks 
and promote healthier snack choices. Bui and Fazio (2016) used evaluative conditioning to 
train associations of healthful and unhealthful foods. Results showed that training increased 
sensitivity to health and decreased sensitivity to taste. This research suggests possible 
avenues to intervention directed at altering patients’ implicit attitudes towards treatments.  
Chevance et al. (2017) report an interesting study of patients with pulmonary 
respiratory disease undergoing rehabilitation. Such patients are encouraged to be physically 
active yet often find physical activity aversive and fear unpleasant sensations. The authors 
measured implicit attitudes using an IAT measure with the target concepts ‘physical activity’ 
and ‘sedentary’. During rehabilitation, patients took part in supervised sessions of gym type 
physical activity. Implicit attitudes towards physical exercise changed significantly during 
rehabilitation, whereas explicit attitudes towards exercise did not. Moreover, implicit 
attitudes measured at the completion of rehabilitation predicted physical activity 6 months 
later. This study underscores the importance of implicit evaluations in illness contexts. The 
rehabilitation program was not specifically designed to modify implicit evaluations, 
indicating that practicing physical activity itself modified implicit attitudes. Positive 
experience of, or perhaps mere exposure to the attitude object (physical activity), directly 
conditioned an implicit evaluative attitude.  
The upper right portion of Figure 1 depicts the potentially bi-directional relationship 
between implicit attitude and coping behaviour, such that implicit attitudes might impact 
upon initiation and maintenance of coping behaviours, and coping behaviours might as a 
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consequence of conditioning over time, become associated with more positive implicit 
attitudes.   
Future Directions. Further research using implicit attitude measures is warranted, 
and should where possible employ objective outcome measures. Interventions that seek to 
modify patients’ implicit attitudes towards treatment may prove useful. These methods may 
also provide insight into relations between patients and health professionals, for example 
patients’ mistrust (negative affect) towards doctors, that may impact upon appropriate care-
seeking. Implicit affect has been shown to predict detection or acknowledgment of pain in 
patients by non-health professional participants (De Ruddere et al., 2011). Following an 
associative conditioning task in which participants were trained to like or dislike 
photographic images by pairing them with positive or negative personal attributes, 
participants watched video clips of the same people engaging in pain inducing activities and 
were asked to rate their pain. Findings showed that observers’ perceptions of pain were 
moderated by likeability, such that they were less likely to endorse the belief that a patient 
was in severe pain if they had developed negative patient evaluations. Relatedly, Kaseweter, 
Drwecki and Prkachin (2012) report racial bias in pain empathy and treatment 
recommendations suggesting that implicit negative affective stereotypes might be important 
in explaining documented discrepancies in treatment that may extend to older people and 
other negatively stereotyped groups. The observation of symptoms in other people is 
important to symptom management and these studies delineate implicit affective mechanisms 
that might impact upon the professional behaviour of carers, nurses, and physicians.  
Although their effect on automatic affective associations with treatment behaviours 
have not been studied, implementation intentions have been shown to alter emotional 
responses (disgust and fear) to stimuli (Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 
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2009). Relatedly, impulsive defensive reactions to health threat information may be modified 
by self-affirmation techniques (e.g. Kessels, Harris, Ruiter & Klein, 2016).  
A further interesting line of enquiry concerns the use of advertising to condition 
positive evaluations of self-remedies or prescribed medications in those few countries (USA 
and New Zealand) that permit direct to consumer advertising of prescribed medications. Just 
as product labeling and images might impact upon healthful misinterpretations of food 
products (e.g. Klepacz, Nash, Egan, Hodgkins & Raats, 2016), so pharmaceutical advertising 
might capitalize on viewers passive goal for curative remedies by increasing their implicit 
affect for particular drugs and influencing requests made to physicians (e.g. Biegler, 2015).  
Strategic Automatization of Coping Behaviours  
In addition to influencing the cognitive accessibility of coping responses and 
evaluative orientation towards a particular coping response, automatic processes may govern 
or be leveraged to influence individuals’ likelihood to (1) adopt new, goal-directed (i.e. 
treatment, health) behaviours and/or successfully navigate medical procedures, (2) maintain 
goal-directed behaviours over time (i.e. adherence), and (3) change existing, health-risky 
behaviours. Promoting these behaviours is of considerable importance for healthcare, given 
evidence that patients often delay seeking necessary care, fail to complete treatments, miss 
medical appointments, and do not adhere to medication or other self-management behaviours 
(e.g. Kravitz & Melnikow, 2004; Orbell, Hagger, Brown, & Tidy, 2006; Van Dulmen et al., 
2007). 
A key element of the CS-SRM shown to promote behaviours in all three of these 
domains, is action planning. Action planning refers to a process of consciously considering 
and deciding upon actions to take in the pursuit of a goal and typically involves mentally 
pairing expected environmental cues with intended actions (see Hagger & Luszczynska, 2014 
for a conceptual review). For example, individuals may form implementation intentions or “if 
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[cue], then [action]” plans that link cues to an intended action (Gollwitzer, 1999). The CS-
SRM additionally sees action planning as a process of “preparing the perceptual system” for 
upcoming medical procedures or, theoretically, for rapid detection of symptoms associated 
with disease or treatment progression (e.g., symptoms that treatment is not working as cues 
for seeking follow-up care). An important element/process of action planning is a 
visualization of the future context in which action should occur. The planned “cues” for 
behaviour may be environmental/situational cues meant to trigger a desired action (e.g. 
‘Immediately after I have eaten my breakfast, then I will take my medication”). They may 
also be somatic “cues” or sequences of somatic experiences associated with a medical 
procedure, illness, or treatment (e.g. “If my legs are swollen, then I will go to the emergency 
room”). Although action planning is a purposeful (i.e. conscious and reflective) process, 
evidence suggests that it functions to promote these behavioural outcomes via automatic 
mechanisms. Planning may also have particularly powerful benefits for populations with poor 
prospective memory (Wolff, Warner, Ziegelmann, Wurm, & Kliegel, 2016), such as older 
patients (Zogg, Woods, Sauceda, Wiebe, & Simoni, 2012), who are much more likely to have 
chronic illness than younger individuals. 
Promoting treatment initiation. Research regarding treatment initiation has largely 
focused on reflective factors, such as explicit beliefs and behavioural intentions (Hagger et 
al., 2017). However, reflective factors, such as behavioural intentions are notoriously weakly 
related to behaviour, a phenomenon referred to as the “intention-behaviour gap” (Orbell & 
Sheeran, 1998; Orbell, 2004; Inauen et al., 2016). Individuals’ engagement in action planning 
and a process called coping planning (Schwarzer, 2008) which concerns specifying plans to 
overcoming anticipated barriers to action improves the translation of intention into action.  
Planning promotes behaviour enactment through multiple automatic mechanisms. 
First, identifying and rehearsing a behavioural context cue makes that cue more accessible in 
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memory and ensures that the cue is detected when it is encountered. Second, by forming a 
strong link in memory between cue and action, the cue acquires the ability to automatically 
elicit action. That is, planning with mental rehearsal fosters implicit goal activation (Sheeran 
et al., 2013), or the automatic activation of cognitive schemas associated with goal pursuit in 
the presence of associated cues (Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Papies, Stroebe & Aarts, 2008). 
Evidence for the strategic automatization engendered by planning comes from research in 
laboratory settings, where the researcher can determine the action cue for all participants and 
collect response-time measures to gauge mental accessibility of those trained/planned cues. 
For example, Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden (1999) had individuals plan to collect a coupon 
in a location with salient external cues (e.g., a fire hose) and then measured the mental 
accessibility of cues in the individuals’ minds with a lexical decision task with these cues as 
stimuli. Participants in the planning condition responded faster to these cues than participants 
in the control condition, and response latency mediated the effect of the intervention on 
behavioural enactment (obtaining the coupon).  
A host of studies have investigated the role of planning in enhancing the likelihood of 
enacting behaviours, including breast and testicular self-examination (Orbell, Hodgkins & 
Sheeran, 1997; Prestwich et al., 2005; Benyamini, Ashery, & Shiloh, 2011; Heverin & Byrne, 
2011), health screening (Neter, Stein, Barnett-Griness, Rennert, & Hagoel, 2014; Rutter, 
Steadman, Quine, & Field, 2006; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), medication and supplement 
adherence (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Liu & Park, 2004; Jackson et al, 2006; Brown, Sheeran, 
& Reuber, 2009; Chatzisarantis, Hagger, & Wang, 2010; O’Carroll, Chambers, Dennis, 
Sudlow, & Johnston, 2014; Brom et al., 2014), diet (Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, de Ridder, de 
Wit, & Kroese, 2011), and exercise (Belanger-Gravel, Godin, Bilodeau, & Poirier, 2013; 
Carraro & Gaudreau, 2013; Milne, Orbell & Sheeran, 2002). However, few studies to date 
have investigated their use in clinical samples or employed planning to teach patients how to 
AUTOMATIC PROCESSES AND ILLNESS SELF-REGULATION  28 
 
prepare for and respond to unpleasant medical procedures. Farmer and colleagues (2016) 
tested a brief planning intervention as a sub-study of a clinical trial for a new medication for 
Type 2 diabetes. Patients in the intervention group were prompted at the beginning of the trial 
to formulate action plans to take the study medication regularly (they were asked two 
questions: “When do you plan to take your study medication” and “Where do you plan to 
take your study medication”) and were reminded by nurses to use their action plans during 
the trial. These intervention participants did not show any difference in adherence compared 
to control participants, who followed the standard trial protocol. Likewise, Lourenco and 
colleagues (2014) found no effect on medication adherence of an action planning (i.e. plans 
to enact treatment behaviour) plus coping planning (i.e. plans to overcome barriers) 
intervention compared to control condition in a sample of patients with coronary artery 
disease. The intervention prompted participants to write up to three action plans regarding 
when, where, and how they intended to take their medication; and to identify up to three 
barriers and one to two strategies for overcoming these barriers to taking their medication. 
The lack of benefit from the basic planning interventions reported by Farmer et al. (2016) and 
Lorenco et al., (2014) may be attributable to lack of commitment to, or mental rehearsal of 
the plans, since participants were only asked to answer questions about plans and not to 
rehearse the planned cue-action pairings in mind. However, in a similar intervention (without 
rehearsal of plans) in a sample of patients presenting with knee pain to a physiotherapist, Hui, 
Hagger, Goh, Hart, and Gucciardi (2017) found that action-plus-coping planning resulted in 
significantly greater engagement in preventive therapy home-sessions compared to controls. 
Orbell and Sheeran (2000) found joint replacement patients who planned walking activity 
post surgery recovered more quickly. In a correlational study of patients with coronary heart 
disease, Sniehotta et al. (2005) found that self-reported action (e.g., “I have made a detailed 
plan regarding when to exercise”, completely disagree (=1) to totally agree (=4) and coping 
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plans (e.g. “I have made a detailed plan regarding what to do if something interferes with my 
plans”) predicted adherence to physical activity recommendations for cardiac rehabilitation 
post heart attack. Johnson and colleagues (Johnson & Leventhal, 1974; Johnson et al., 1973) 
found that patients who planned to swallow in response to a sensation during endoscopy 
experienced less stress during the procedure and required lower doses of tranquilizer—and 
these effects occurred for some without a conscious memory of the instruction session the 
night before. 
Promoting longer-term behavioural maintenance/adherence. Recent literature has 
outlined automatic processes involved in longer-term treatment adherence (i.e. maintenance) 
within a CS-SRM framework (Phillips, Cohen, Burns, Abrams, & Renninger, 2016; Phillips, 
Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2013)—specifically the development of treatment-related habits. 
Briefly, once a patient has formed illness representations and decided upon a course of 
action, he/she forms treatment representations, may or may not engage in formal action 
planning, and attempts the treatment. With initial treatment attempts, patients may attain 
“mental model coherence” if they receive experiential feedback that the treatment is working 
as expected. Theoretically, if patients’ expectations for treatment outcome are met, their 
models will be coherent, and the treatment action is more likely to be repeated. If an 
unexpected and/or particularly aversive outcome occurs when treatment is attempted, the 
patient may re-formulate illness and treatment representations and be less likely to repeat the 
tested treatment. With coherence and continued repetition in the short-term (short term 
adherence), which may be entirely reflectively controlled, treatment-related actions can 
become habitual, if repeated in the presence of stable contextual cues. These processes are 
depicted in the upper right hand portion of Figure 1.  
Habits are a specific form of cue-response association formed in memory as a 
consequence of repeated performance of a particular action in response to a particular cue 
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context (Wood & Rünger, 2016). Habits are distinctive from primed goals in that whereas a 
primed goal may elicit a range of different behaviours consistent with that goal, a habit links 
a context cue to a particular action. A mental representation is formed of the cue-response 
association. Although habits can originate from conscious goal directed behaviour as outlined 
above, once formed through repetition, strong habits become goal independent—that is, 
action will follow automatically whenever the cue is encountered, irrespective of current 
motivational state. For example, Neal, Wood, Wu and Kurlandi (2011) showed that people 
who possessed a strong habit to eat popcorn in the cinema ate similar quantities of popcorn, 
when in a cinema context (but not in an alternate context), whether the popcorn was fresh or 
stale. People with weak habits were guided by their motivation and ate less of the stale 
popcorn. Orbell and Verplanken (2010) showed that habit is associated with implicit attention 
to cues and strength of habit predicted the likelihood of smokers making action slips (such as 
lighting a cigarette) after smoking in public places became illegal and they were motivated to 
comply with the law.  This attribute of habits, the ability to guide behaviour independently of 
motivation, has positive advantages in regard to desired habits. For example, habits will 
persist in the face of waning motivation, stress or distraction (e.g. Neal, Wood & Drolet, 
2013). Rebar, Elavsky, Maher, Doerksen, and Conroy (2014) found that individuals with 
strong exercise habits were likely to exercise even on days when their intention to do so was 
low(er). Habits are resistant to changes in reflective factors, such as behavioural intentions or 
beliefs, do not tax cognitive and self-regulatory resources, and are the default behaviour. 
Therefore, theoretically, habitual treatment-related actions are more likely to be repeated in 
the future than non-habits, which are subject to changes in attitudes, goals, and mental 
resources (Hunt, Matarazzo, Weiss, & Gentry, 1979). Habits should therefore promote 
optimal long-term treatment adherence, or maintenance (Rothman, Sheeran, & Wood, 2009; 
Rothman et al., 2015) and optimize health outcomes, where habitual actions are appropriate.  
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Habits can be measured by examining response times in matching cue contexts to 
stimuli (e.g. Neal, Wood, Labrecque & Lally, 2012), by multiplying behavioural frequency 
and context stability (e.g., Wood, Tam, & Witt, 2005) or, more conveniently in clinical 
contexts or when it is desirable to assess strength of automaticity characteristic of a strong 
habit and changes over time as habits develop, by employing a self-report habit index (SRHI) 
which has been validated against implicit measures (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003; Orbell & 
Verplanken, 2010; Galla & Duckworth, 2015). The questionnaire requires respondents to 
respond to 12 items assessing the extent to which their action (e.g. taking medication) is 
automatic, non-deliberative (e.g. I start doing it before I realize I am doing it) and repetitive. 
The questionnaire is generic and can be adapted to any cue-response of interest by employing 
an appropriate stem that specifies the cue and the response (e.g. ‘taking my medication 
immediately after eating my breakfast is….’). Patients might be asked to specify their own 
cues for the behaviour in question.  
Evidence for the importance of treatment-related habits for treatment adherence 
comes from observational studies that measure patient-reported habit strength for engaging in 
their treatments (taking medications and engaging in physical activity). Bolman, Arwert, and 
Völlink (2011) found that adolescents’ habit strength for taking their prophylactic asthma 
medication predicted adherence. Phillips et al. (2013) found that patients’ reported habit 
strength for taking their hypertension medications predicted variance in objectively-measured 
adherence, incrementally to reflective variables (e.g., beliefs about medicines). Phillips et al. 
(2016) replicated these findings in a more complex illness/treatment domain (Type 2 
diabetes) and for multiple treatment behaviours (taking medication and physical activity). 
Using more qualitative methodology, Brooks et al. (2015) found that specific routines 
characterize successful self-management of asthma, such as keeping one’s asthma inhaler in 
the bathroom to facilitate the routine of using the inhaler when engaging in one’s typical 
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morning hygiene routine. Evidence has also been found for the importance of habit in other 
behavioural domains. For example, Presseau et al. (2014) found that providers’ reports of 
intentions and behavioural automaticity predicted their reported engagement in several 
patient care behaviours (providing weight advice; prescribing particular treatments). And, 
habit strength has been very widely studied in the domain of health-related behaviour in 
general (e.g., physical activity and dietary behaviours; Arnautovska, Fleig, O’Callaghan, & 
Hamilton, 2016; Gardner, de Bruin & Lally, 2011). 
While patients may form habits spontaneously via behavioural repetition, this will not 
necessarily be the case if the behaviour (for example medication use) has not been repeatedly 
performed in exactly the same cue/context. Inconsistent or unreliable adherence may 
therefore be accounted for by lapses in memory or motivation. Encouraging patients to form 
habits may be beneficial in many clinical contexts. For example, developing an exercise 
routine such as walking daily, eating fruit daily, using prophylactic medications, or washing 
hands when changing dressings may all benefit from interventions to create habits. Effective 
development of habit requires attention to selection of appropriate cues, and consistent 
performance of the same act. The cue must be salient, and occur at the same frequency as the 
desired action. The cue, if a part of an existing behavioural routine, such as eating lunch, 
should ideally be identified at the end of the existing routine, or task boundary (after finishing 
bathroom routine, after finishing lunch, as soon as I return home), where behaviour is less 
likely to automatically run on to another element of an ongoing task and the opportunity be 
missed. Additionally, attention should be given to the action itself and to ensuring that people 
possess the necessary knowledge and skills to perform the action and any necessary 
equipment is kept visible and available (Wood & Rünger, 2016; Lally & Gardner, 2013) 
Habits do not form quickly, however (Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010), and 
planning via implementation intentions may enhance the speed of habit development. 
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Evidence that action planning can lead to automatic engagement in behaviour comes from 
habit development interventions; for example, Judah, Gardner, and Aunger (2013) found that 
pairing flossing with an existing tooth-brushing habit (specifically, flossing after the cue of 
brushing) increased behavioural automaticity over the course of a month, and Orbell and 
Verplanken (2010) found that implementation intentions to floss in response to a specific 
situational cue resulted in significantly greater flossing habit strength compared to controls. 
Overcoming existing, counter-intentional (health-compromising) habits.  
Modifying unhealthy behaviours is an important endeavour, particularly since obesity and 
substance use have high prevalence in sick populations, and changing the course of serious 
illness often implies lifestyle change. The focus on automatic processes involved in unhealthy 
behaviours no doubt arises in part from dual process theorizing that pits healthful intentions 
against unhealthful implicit mechanisms—a dichotomy that has evidence from neuroscience, 
which shows habitual and goal-directed behaviours are controlled by different areas of the 
brain (see Dolan & Dayan; Wood & Rünger, 2016). The maintenance of undesired habits is 
not the consequence of a strong desire to continue the behaviour, although people may 
sometimes infer (and report) that their actions are motivated because ease of choice and 
action is confused with intentionality (‘I always do it so I must want to’). Because habits and 
goals are governed by different brain regions, merely developing an intention to change 
behaviour will not alter the factors that control action. In short, undesired habits are 
maintained by recurrent activation by the cues with which they are associated. Undoing 
habits represents a significant challenge for illness self-regulation.  
Strategies for modifying these existing unhealthy behaviours should not rely on 
individuals’ intentions to do so, given the lack of importance of intentions when habits are 
strong (Aarts, 2007). Instead, changing habits will require individuals to be aware of the 
environmental cues (i.e., via conscious monitoring of one’s own behaviour in context) and to 
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take advantage of opportunities to change these cues and to establish new, healthy cue-
behaviour associations. We exemplify possible approaches to changing existing habits, by 
modifying availability of the cue, or the response, or the cue-response association in memory. 
 First, one may take advantage of natural context changes in order to implement new, 
healthier habits (Wood, Tam, & Wit, 2005). For example, when one moves to another 
location (moves home), the individual can avoid old behavioural cues and set new cues for 
healthier behaviours in the new context/location—the context change not only removes the 
individual from existing cues but provides an opportunity for the individual to engage in 
motivated behaviour change (the “habit discontinuity hypothesis”; Verplanken, Walker, 
Davis, & Jurasek, 2008; Verplanken & Roy, 2016). Acute illness may similarly cause 
sufficient disruption in previous routines so as to provide a ‘window of opportunity’ to 
remove context cues from the home or provide an opportunity to create new health promoting 
habits, as previously described. 
Two other approaches to overcoming unhealthy habits are outlined in a recent 
conceptual review by Papies (2016), who distinguishes between interventions that alter cues 
to unhealthy behaviours (“cueing interventions”) and interventions that train new responses 
to existing cues (“training interventions”). Papies, Potjes, Keesman, Schwinghammer, and 
van Koningsbruggen (2014) found that a health prime reduced the number of unhealthy 
snacks purchased by overweight but not normal weight individuals (compared to overweight 
individuals in a control condition without a prime). Another cueing intervention method to 
change eating behaviour for the better is to alter portion sizes of foods, which can lead to 
more (healthy) or less (unhealthy) foods being eaten without individuals’ awareness 
(Hollands et al., 2015). Evidence in populations with chronic illness engaging in lifestyle 
change efforts for illness self-regulation is lacking. 
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Employing implementation intentions to automate new cue-behaviour associations 
involves replacing an existing cue-response association in memory with an alternate response 
to the same cue. However, evidence to date shows the cue may activate both ‘old’ and new 
responses, leaving behavioural choice to the individual (Adriaanse et al., 2011) and 
necessitating effortful inhibition of response. Armitage (2016) recently provided evidence 
that implementation intentions may help smokers quit. In a non-clinical population, 
Adriaanse, de Ridder, and de Wit (2009) found that implementation intentions that specified 
a “motivational (why) cue” rather than a “situational (where/when) cue” were more 
successful at altering students’ unhealthy snacking habits. Adriaanse, van Oosten, de Ridder, 
de Wit, and Evers (2011) found, however, that implementation intentions with a negating 
structure (i.e., “if [cue], then not [behaviour]” strengthened the existing cue-behaviour 
association.  
Inhibitory control training seeks to help individuals overcome impulses to engage in 
health-risky behaviours by giving them repeated practice at self-regulation. Allom, Mullan, 
and Hagger (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of inhibitory control training methods and 
found that a go/no-go task resulted in the largest effects on health behaviour (specifically, 
eating and alcohol consumption behaviours). Other such intervention methods, which aim to 
alter the automatic behavioural responses to cues, include attentional bias modification and 
approach-avoidance training. For example, Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, and Lindenmeyer 
(2011) conducted cognitive-bias modification training using an avoidance-training task in 
which patients with alcoholism completed four sessions in which they were trained to push a 
joystick away (“avoidance movements”) from alcohol images; compared to non-trained 
patients, trained patients showed more automatic avoidance of novel alcohol images in 
subsequent treatment sessions and had better treatment outcomes a year later. More research 
is needed in these promising areas of intervention into automatic illness processes, because 
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evidence for these techniques is primarily limited to young, healthy participants and 
laboratory studies with brief follow-up periods.  
Future directions. Planning interventions that strategically automatize behaviour 
show considerable promise in preparing for medical procedures and in ensuring opportunities 
for treatment are not missed, and in establishing new adherence habits, for example. These 
may be particularly valuable in contexts where adherence is independent of current symptom 
experience. Interventions might usefully target both motivational factors (illness 
representations and treatment beliefs) and planning.  For example, O’Carroll et al. (2014) 
report an intervention to increase adherence to antihypertensive medications among patients 
following stroke. The intervention addressed both reflective (patient beliefs) and automatic 
(habit formation via implementation intentions) processes, and increased adherence relative 
to controls (10% greater, measured electronically, over 3 months). Effects were explained by 
changes in beliefs (lower concerns about the treatment) and reduction in forgetting to take 
their medications. Unsurprisingly, the intervention was effective only for those who did not 
have pre-existing routines, emphasizing the need for baseline assessment of adherence and 
where possible, populations for whom a behaviour is novel, (inception/incident samples) 
(Hagger et a., 2017; Leventhal et al., 2016; Phillips et al., 2016). This study is a good 
example of how an intervention can target both automatic and reflective CS-SRM processes 
to improve adherence. 
Further research might evaluate whether tying meaning to cues might facilitate 
automatic activation of schemas associated with better self-regulation of illness threats. For 
example, if patients are trained to identify a symptom as an indication of illness worsening, 
appropriate care-seeking protocols could be automatically activated. Research might also 
consider the types of cues, timing of cues, etc, that might optimize effectiveness of action 
planning interventions. Planning interventions in which patients make and rehearse plans for 
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actions in response to somatic experiences and or treatment actions in response to contextual 
cues may also affect implicit attitudes and reflective factors that could further improve 
intervention effectiveness, such as patient self-efficacy for managing the threat, attitudes 
regarding the importance of managing the threat, and concerns regarding the threat and its 
management. 
It is important to recognize when routinization is and is not appropriate. Self-
regulation of complex chronic illnesses likely require multiple treatment-related actions, 
some of which require a deliberative response and some that would benefit from being fully 
automatic so as to free cognitive resources for other tasks (and to avoid forgetting the 
treatment-action). For example, self-regulation of Diabetes often requires regular blood 
glucose monitoring, insulin administration, medication adherence, physical activity, and 
dietary restrictions/practices. Whereas some treatment behaviours may optimally be 
habitualized (e.g., medication-taking and physical activity; Phillips et al., 2016), others such 
as response to a blood glucose monitoring test (e.g., eating a snack, injecting insulin, taking a 
walk) depends entirely on the blood glucose reading and may therefore be a process 
optimally under deliberative control.  
Interventions designed to promote optimal self-regulation of illness will likely include 
habit formation strategies, such as implementation intentions, action planning and coping 
planning, context changes, piggybacking on existing cues, situational reminders, etc. (see 
Rothman et al., 2015). However, the particular actions that might appropriately be 
habitualized, their interactions with other treatment-related actions, and for which patients 
still need to be determined. Additionally, given that weight loss, smoking cessation or 
reduction in alcohol use is “prescribed” for many chronic conditions and for preparation for 
surgery, inhibition of existing habits may need to be integrated into interventions that 
promote health-promoting habits. 
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Conclusions 
Early accounts of the CS-SRM (e.g., Leventhal et al., 1980) anticipated a role for non-
conscious processes in the important tasks of detecting, identifying and regulating illness in 
the self. Only recently have specific automatic processes been identified and methods 
developed to study them. We found evidence for a developing science addressing implicit 
processes in illness self-regulation and have addressed processes relating to illness-threat 
detection/recognition and interpretation, initiation of coping responses, treatment choice and 
action planning, and longer-term management of illness. The present article is the first to 
review how such processes are implicated in illness self-regulation and to outline an agenda 
for future research. The current review also extends recent literature on automatic processes 
and health, in that it is the first to take a broad view of health-related behaviour that includes 
but is not restricted to issues of preventive health behaviour or to investigation of a particular 
behaviour or illness. Health psychology can and should be equally concerned with processes 
of illness self-regulation.  
Some have questioned whether it is appropriate, or even ethical to use methods that 
seek to direct behaviour by means of the unconscious. However Petrescu and colleagues 
(2016) report a study that assessed the acceptability of a range of public health interventions 
that were presented to randomized groups of participants in the US and UK as operating 
either by conscious or non conscious mechanisms and found no difference in acceptability 
according to described mechanism. Perceptions of efficacy of interventions drove judgements 
of acceptability. Research in this field requires of necessity consent of participants and 
debriefing procedures. People are continuously exposed to ‘marketing interventions’ that 
promote ill-health via mechanisms of which the recipient is unaware. Research and 
intervention in this field seeks to identify and address these influences and their 
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consequences, and to some extent, to leverage phenomena in the pursuit of promotion, 
restoration and maintenance of health.   
 We have organized and presented the evidence within a CS-SRM framework to 
illustrate how integration of methods and theory might enhance understanding of illness self-
regulation. While the present review focuses upon aspects of non-conscious self-regulation, 
development in this field will likely require integration of these processes with conscious 
reflective self-regulatory processes and their dynamic interactions. 
Disclosure Statement. The authors have nothing to disclose. 
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Table 1.: Glossary of key concepts and methods discussed in the review.  
Section of the review in 
which the terms are 
discussed 
Terms Definition/Description  Examples of references cited in the text 
(see text for additional references) 
I. Automatic Processes in 
Individuals’ Illness-Threat 
Detection and Interpretation 
Explicit 
cognition 
The explicit, cognitive products of 
cognitive processing, such as beliefs 
about one’s illness and treatment that 
are often measured with self-report 
measures. 
Hagger & Orbell, 2003; Hagger, Koch, 
Chatzisarantis & Orbell, 2017. 
 
 
 Implicit 
cognition 
The cognitions and processes that stay 
outside of a person’s conscious 
awareness but nonetheless, when 
activated, may control thought and 
action even when an individual is 
unaware of this influence.  
Aarts, 2007; Bargh, 1994 
 Illness schema: 
Cognitive 
structure 
The organization of information one 
holds about an object/behavior in 
memory (e.g., schematic knowledge 
about illness including associated 
symptoms, explicit beliefs about the 
illness cause, consequences etc., and 
appropriate actions/responses. 
Henderson, Hagger & Orbell, 2007; 
Leventhal, Leventhal & Breland, 2011; 
Leventhal, Leventhal & Contrada, 1992; 
Leventhal, Phillips & Burns, 2016 
 Attentional bias A cognitive process in which particular 
stimuli (e.g. of a certain category, such 
as symptoms) capture a person’s 
attention; that is, the person is biased to 
attend to these stimuli. 
Crombez, Van Ryckeghem, Eccelston & 
Van Damme, 2013; Henderson, Hagger & 
Orbell, 2007; Hughes, Hirsch, Chadler & 
Moss-Morris, 2016; Hughes, Chadler, 
Hirsch & Moss-Morris, 2017; MacLeod, 
Matthews & Tata, 1986; Pincus & Morley, 
2001; Stroop, 1935  
 Interpretation 
bias 
A cognitive process in which 
individuals resolve ambiguity and 
uncertainty in determining the meaning 
of an event/stimulus and selecting a 
Heathcote, Jacobs, Eccleston, Fox & Lau, 
2017; Hirsch, Meeten, Krahe & Reeder, 
2016; Hughes, Chadler, Hirsch & Moss-
Morris, 2017; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
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response to the event/stimulus. 2000; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Schoth & 
Liossi, 2016 
 Implicit normal 
somatic and 
functional self-
concept 
A schema that encompasses 
information about the self, stored in 
memory. The self-concept is vast and 
active subsets guide behaviour. The 
degree to which an individual’s self 
concept deviates from an ‘illness self-
concept’ may determine interpretations 
of symptoms as normal versus 
threatening.  
Leventhal, Leventhal & Breland, 2011; 
Leventhal, Phillips & Burns, 2016b; 
Marcus & Wurf, 1987: Orbell & 
Henderson, 2016; Riebel, Egloff & 
Witthoft, 2014; Smeesters, Wheeler & 
Kay, 2010; Wheeler, De Marree & Petty, 
2007 
 Priming The activation of relevant mental 
representations by external stimuli. 
Aarts (2007); Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; 
Henderson, Hagger & Orbell, 2007; 
Orbell, Henderson & Hagger, 2015; 
Papies, 2016 
 Cognitive Bias 
Modification 
Procedures in which participants are 
trained to disengage from stimuli using 
a modified visual probe task.  
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002; Sharpe, 
Ianiello, Dear, Perry, Refshauge & 
Nicholas, 2012; Heathcote, Jacobs, van 
Ryckejhen, Fisher, Eccleston, Fox & Lau, 
2018 
 Decision 
making biases 
A field of research that explores the 
role of illusion and cognitive biases in 
decision-making. Biases include over-
confidence, anchoring, availability 
heuristics etc. 
Pohl, 2012; Saposnik, Redelmeier, Ruff & 
Tobler, 2016 
II. Automatic Processes in 
Individuals’ Illness-Threat 
Coping Response and 
Management 
   
A. Cognitive 
Accessibility of Coping 
Responses 
Automatic 
coping 
responses 
Behavioural tendencies that are 
associated with illness experiences in 
the past and are encoded as part of the 
Henderson, Orbell & Hagger, 2009; 
Leventhal, Leventhal & Contrada, 1998; 
Lowe & Norman, 2017 
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illness schema and activated when that 
illness schema is subsequently 
activated—perhaps becoming the 
‘default’ actions that are activated 
along with other information about 
illness. 
B. Implicit Affective 
Evaluations of Coping 
Behaviours 
Implicit 
attitudes 
Automatic affective evaluations of 
objects or behaviours that have been 
learned through past experience and 
may develop indirectly (without direct 
personal experience of the 
object/behaviour). 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Greenwald, McPhee & Schwartz, 1998 
 Implicit 
Association 
Test (IAT) 
A computerized test that presents 
participants with stimuli that represent 
two comparison categories (e.g., “self” 
vs “other”) and measures the strength 
of association of these categories with 
target attributes (“healthy” vs “ill”) via 
reaction time assessment (e.g., reaction 
time to “self” “healthy” word pairs 
compared to “self” “ill” word pairs). 
Chevance, Caudroit, Romain & Boiche, 
2017; Chevance, Varray & Boiche, 2017; 
Greenwald, McPhee & Schwartz, 1998; 
Grrenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003 
 Evaluative 
Priming Task 
A task in which participants are primed 
with health or treatment-related stimuli 
(e.g., “exercise”) and then asked to 
judge a target word as positive or 
negative in valence. If the individual 
has a positive implicit attitude towards 
the stimulus, it is assumed he/she will 
more quickly judge a positive target 
word as positive and more slowly 
judge a negative target word as 
negative after being primed with the 
stimulus. 
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 
1986; Herring, White, Jabeen, Hinojos, 
Terrazas, Reyes, Taylor & Crites, 2013 
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 Attention 
Misattribution 
Procedure 
(AMP) 
A task in which participants are primed 
with an image or word of interest (e.g., 
health- and treatment-related stimuli) 
and then asked to judge how pleasing a 
neutral stimulus, such as a Chinese 
pictograph, is. Implicit attitudes are 
inferred from the degree to which an 
individual finds the neutral stimulus to 
be more or less pleasing than similar 
images presented without a prime. 
Payne, Cheng, Goverun & Steward, 2005; 
Payne, Lee, Giletta & Prinstein, 2016. 
 Evaluative (or 
associative) 
conditioning 
A technique for modifying implicit 
attitudes that trains participants to form 
new affective associations towards 
target stimuli by pairing them with 
positive and negative unconditioned 
stimuli. 
De Ruddere, Goubert, Prkachin, 
Stevens,Van Ryckeghem & Crombez, 
2011; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens & Crombez, 2010; Hollands, 
Prestwich & Marteau, 2011; Riebel, Egloff 
& Witthoft, 2014 
C. Strategic 
Automatization of Coping 
Behaviours 
Action 
planning 
A process of consciously considering 
and deciding upon actions to take in 
the pursuit of a goal, which typically 
involves mentally pairing expected 
cues (environmental or somatic) with 
intended actions. Also a process of 
associating meaning and appropriate 
responses with expected somatic 
experiences such as would occur 
during medical procedures. Certain 
types of planning such as 
implementation intentions can 
strategically automatize responses to 
cues.  
Gollwitzer, 1999; Hagger & Luszczynska, 
2014; Schwarzer, 2008 
 Implementation 
Intentions 
A specific type of action plan that 
explicates “if [cue], then [action]” links 
that lead to strategic automatization.  
Gollwitzer, 1999; Hui, Hagger, Goh, Hart 
& Gucciardi, 2007; Neter, Stein, Barnett-
Griness, Rennert & Hagoel, 2014; 
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O’Carroll, Chambers, Dennis, Sudlow & 
Johnston, 2014; Orbell, Hodgkins & 
Sheeran, 1997; Orbell & Sheeran, 1999, 
2000; Orbell & Verplanken, 2010 
i. Promoting treatment 
initiation 
Coping 
planning 
Specifying plans to overcome 
anticipated barriers to action and 
responses to relapse. 
Johnson & Leventhal, 1974; Schwarzer, 
2008 
ii. Promoting longer-
term behavioural 
maintenance/adherence 
Habit A specific form of cue-response 
association formed in memory as a 
consequence of repeated performance 
of a particular action in response to a 
particular cue context. Once formed, 
the context cue automatically elicits 
behavior.  
O’Carroll, Chambers, Dennis, Sudlow & 
Johnston, 2014; Orbell & Verplanken, 
2010; Phillips, Cohen, Burns, Abrams & 
Renninger, 2016; Phillips, Leventhal & 
Burns, 2013; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003; 
Wood & Runger, 2016;  
iii. Overcoming 
existing, counter-
intentional (health-
compromising) habits 
Habit 
discontinuity 
hypothesis 
The proposition that context change 
removes an individual from existing 
behavioural cues and provides an 
opportunity for the individual to 
engage in motivated behaviour change. 
Verplanken, Walker, Davis & Jurasek, 
2008; Verplanken & Roy, 2016.  
 Cueing/Priming 
interventions 
A strategy for overcoming counter-
intentional habits by altering the cues 
to the unhealthy behaviours or 
activating health directed goals. 
Hollands et al., 2015; Papies, Potjes, 
Keesman, Schwinghammer & von 
Koningsbruggen, 2014; Papies, 2016 
 Training new 
responses to 
cues  
A strategy for overcoming counter-
intentional habits by training new 
responses to existing cues. 
Adriaanse, de Ridder, & de Witt, (2009); 
Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, de Ridder, de Wit 
& Kroese (2011) 
 Inhibitory 
control training 
A strategy for helping individuals 
overcome impulses to engage in 
health-risky behaviours by giving them 
repeated practice at self-regulation. 
Allom, Mullan & Hagger, 2016;Wiers, 
Eberl, Rinck, Becker & Lindenmeyer, 
2011 
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Figure 1. Representation of the Roles of Implicit Processes in Illness Self-Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
